Nº 4 / 2025 - octubre - diciembre
Free-riding and the prisoner’s dilemma in takeover bids
Álvaro Ispizua Mendieta
Universidad de Mondragón, Oñate (País Vasco), España
Abstract:
Severals problems arise in the dynamics of a takeover bid, such as free riding and the prisoner’s dilemma. Some models propose the need to make a partial or a two-tier bid. Spanish regulations require mandatory takeover bids to be formulated for all of the company’s securities. Furthermore, in newly created companies, various bylaw clauses are established to protect minority shareholders in merger and acquisition processes.
Keywords: Takeovers, mergers and acquisitions, takeover bids, agency cost, opportunistic behavior, prisoner’s dilemma, estatutory law.
DIRECCIÓN REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE CAPITAL RIESGO
Prof. Dr. D. Rafael Marimón
Catedrático de Derecho Mercantil
Universidad de Valencia
Catedrático de Derecho Mercantil
Universidad de Valencia
DIRECCIÓN BOLETÍN DE ACTUALIDAD DEL MERCADO ESPAÑOL DE CAPITAL RIESGO
Sr. D. Miguel Recondo
Instituto de Capital Riesgo (INCARI)
Instituto de Capital Riesgo (INCARI)

