Entrepreneurship financing, venture capital and conflicts of interest

Entrepreneurship financing, venture capital and conflicts of interest

Abstract:

Start-ups, due to their high growth potential, face the problem of raising finance. This paper reflects on the empirical evidence dealing with conflicts of interest that arise in the field of equity financing by new partners. When the firm wishes to make a new share issue, it faces the problem of information asymmetry when setting an issue price. As a result, the shareholder tries to protect himself through anti-dilution clauses.
Empirical studies show an interest of the majority shareholder in enjoying and retaining the private benefits of control. Empirical evidence also supports the lack of alignment between the director and the owner. We can draw the conclusion that business reality is a complex reality in which conflicts of interest arise. These conflicts of interest bring financing difficulties when trying to attract new capital contributions from new
partners and thus cause capital constraints.

Keywords: Entrepreneurship, information asymmetry, private benefits of control, agency cost, stock market listing